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THE LAWYERS' SIDE OF THE SUITS AGAINST
REAL ESTATE BROKERS*
WILLIAM RANN NEWCOMB
Chairman, Unauthorized Practice Committee, Denver Bar Association

It is difficult to speak on behalf of other lawyers because they,
themselves, are likely to entertain many different opinions. However, you should not be misled by the occasional lawyer who expresses opposition to the activity on behalf of the bar associations
in bringing these suits against real estate brokers. It is clear
that the overwhelming majority of lawyers in Denver and in
Colorado do support the purposes and the objectives of this litigation. You should also know that Colorado is not alone, and these
suits are part of a nationwide movement to clarify and define the
proper activities of title companies and real estate brokers.
WHAT ARE THE ISSUES IN THE SUITS?

The charge made by some people that we are trying to put
real estate brokers out of business is the purest form of unadulterated bunk, for that cannot possibly be the result even if the plaintiffs are 100 per cent successful. We do not challenge the right of
brokers to draw every instrument to which they may be a bona
fide party-and that includes the listing. We do not challenge the
right of any persons to act as their own lawyers in preparing
instruments to which they are parties. However, we are challenging the right of brokers and salesmen and title companies to prepare contracts of sale, receipts and options, deeds, leases, notices
to vacate, demands for rent or possession, mortgages, promissory
notes secured by deeds of trust, and other documents involved in
the closing of real estate transactions to which the brokers and
salesmen are not parties.
WHY DID WE BRING THEM?
There are three motives behind these suits:
1., The public interest. The broker is not qualified by education, training or experience to prepare legal instruments. Although he may pick up a smattering of information as to how to
fill in the blanks of a form, no one can reasonably argue that, as
a class, he is as well qualified to do these things as a lawyer.
Great harm has resulted in many instances to members of the
public from improperly prepared contracts and conveyances.
There is no question but what improperly prepared legal documents make for a great mass of the litigation in the courts of our
land. It therefore follows that the preparation of legal documents
should be confined to the care of those who are not only skilled by
reason of their profession and their experience, but as well, their
understanding of the legal significance of all terms employed in the
documents.1

* A digest of an address given by Mr. Newcomb before a meeting of the Denver

Realty Board on May 2, 1951.

1 In re George A. War], Misc. 51808, Detroit, Michigan.
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Is it only in court or in legal proceedings that danger lies in
such evils (unauthorized practice)? On the contrary, the danger there
is at a minimum for very little can go wrong in a court where . . .
the presiding officer is generally a man of judgment and experience
... not so in the office . . . Ignorance and stupidity may here create
damage which the courts of the land cannot thereafter undo.'

The public interest is further involved because a broker is
disqualified through his interest, as a businessman, in his commission from attempting to represent both himself and both
parties to a transaction. He attempts to serve three mastershimself, the seller, and the buyer. Virtually every lawyer in the
state has seen instances of where this inherent conflict in interests
has resulted in a disregard of the legal interests of the real parties
to a transaction. The broker performs his task when he produces
a buyer ready, willing and able to buy. Thereafter, the interests
of the purchaser and seller should assume the controlling role.
2. The interest of the lawyer. The lawyer normally spends
thousands of dollars securing his education. The law requires that
he be examined and licensed. No one here today would claim
that lawyers should not be licensed or that anyone, regardless of
qualifications, should be allowed to practice law in our complex
society. Consequently, in protecting his franchise, the lawyer is
upholding the laws which exist for the protection of the public.
The lawyer is at a competitive disadvantage with the layman who
practices law because the layman can solicit business and advertise,
whereas the lawyer is forbidden by his ethics from so doing. Therefore, this is not a matter of competing in the market place for
legal business, but is a matter of preventing unauthorized practices in the first instance.
3. The interest of promoting more harmonious relations
between brokers and lawyers. The bickering and back-biting between our two groups which I have witnessed in my eight years
of practice, and which has gone on, undoubtedly, for years before
that, is a direct result of a lack of clarification as to the proper role
of brokers and attorneys in real estate transactions. Just as a
lawyer normally has no business advising his client as to values,
the broker has no business advising a purchaser that the title is all
right because some mortgage company lent money on it five years
or six months ago. If these suits result in clarifying and defining
the "rules of the game," there is no reason why brokers and attorneys cannot work together in the interests of the public who
desire that their real estate transactions shall be handled efficiently,
economically, and with due regard to the legal rights of all parties.
Is THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THEM?
You real estate men will not be put out of business, even if
you are restrained from drawing what you call "our contracts."
We know that many of these contracts are prepared at night and
over weekends when lawyers are not available, but see no legitiWHAT

2 People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
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mate reason as to why a short delay to provide for a proper contract would unduly hamper your activities. If the deal itself was
not over-induced by "high pressure" salesmanship, there would be
no withdrawal by the purchaser in this interim period in the
vast majority of cases. We think that the importance of these
transactions, in any event, justifies mature deliberation and a
proper agreement between the parties. We further feel that even
though an occasional deal may fall through, to the chagrin of the
broker, the total volume of real estate transactions will not vary
one iota. We further see a possibility of working out some form
of simple receipt wherein the purchaser would evidence his good
faith by making a deposit, subject to a contract being written
within a very short period of time by an attorney of his selection,
or of the seller's selection, satisfactory to both. Of course, by its
very nature, such a receipt, if our theory of these suits is correct,
could not constitute a contract binding upon the parties.
I wish to emphasize that when the law is clarified as a
result of these suits, we will wish to sit down with you and attempt to work out a practical, workable understanding which will
not interfere with your legitimate operations and which will- be
in accord with whatever decision the courts ultimately render.
There is historical precedent for this in the Denver banks case
where an agreement was made between the Denver Clearing
House Banks Association and the Denver Bar Association pending
the litigation.
EDITOR'S NOTE: There follows a copy of the complaint
against one of the real estate brokers in the suits described above
by Mr. Newcomb. The suits against the other two brokers and
against the Title Guaranty Company and the Record Abstract and
Title Insurance Company are very similar. The complaint is reproduced here in its entirety for the information and enlightenment
of our own profession.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
AND STATE OF COLORADO
CIVIL ACTION NO ----------DIV...............
THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION, a corporation;
THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, a corporation;
WM. RANN NEWCOMB, as Chairman of the Committee
of The Denver Bar Association on Unauthorized Practice; LAWRENCE A. LONG, as Chairman of the Committee of The Colorado Bar Association on Unauthorized
Practice; and WM. RANN NEWCOMB and LAWRENCE
A. LONG, individually,
Plaintiffs
vs
JOHN F. BRUNO,
Defendant

COMPLAINT
in Action for
Injunction
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The plaintiffs allege:
1. That the plaintiff, The Denver Bar Association, and the plaintiff, The
Colorado Bar Association, are corporations, other than for pecuniary profit,
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Colorado, and that each of them is organized for the following purposes and objects
among others: to advance the science of jurisprudence; to promote the administration of justice; to encourage a thorough legal edcuation; and to uphold
the honor and dignity of the Bar. That all of the members of each of them are
attorneys duly licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado. And that they
bring this action on behalf of the public and on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of their members.
2. That the plaintiff, Win. Rann Newcomb, is the Chairman of the Committee of The Denver Bar Association on Unauthorized Practice, and that he
brings this action as such Chairman, pursuant to express authorization by said
The Denver Bar Association. That the plaintiff, Lawrence A. Long, is the
Chairman of the Committee of The Colorado Bar Association on Unauthorized
Practice, and that he brings this action as such chairman, pursuant to express
authorization by said The Colorado Bar Association. That the said plaintiffs
Win. Rann Newcomb and Lawrence A. Long, also bring this action individually
on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other duly licensed attorneys in the
State of Colorado and on behalf of the public.
3. That the defendant is a real estate broker duly licensed as such under
the statutes of the State of Colorado. That the defendant now is and for many
years last past has been engaged in carrying on in the City and County of Denver, Colorado the business of a real estate broker.
4. That the defendant never has been licensed by the Supreme Court of
the State of Colorado to practice law in the State of Colorado and that he
therefore cannot lawfully practice law in the State of Colorado, either in his
own person or through his agents, servants or employees, whether they be attorneys or not.
5. That for many years last past the defendant has been engaged in the
unlawful practice of law in the State of Colorado by preparing for persons
other than himself, as a practice and in numerous transactions, either in his
own person or through his agents, servants and employees, instruments relating to and affecting real estate and the title to real estate, including deeds conveying real estate, deeds of trust and mortgages encumbering real estate,
promissory notes secured by such deeds of trust or mortgages, releases of deeds
of trust and mortgages upon real estate, receipts and options for purchase
contracts of sale and agreements, and by giving advice to the parties to instruments as to the legal effect thereof.
6. That, in doing the acts set out in paragraph numbered 5 hereof, the
defendant, in his own person or through his agents, servants and employees,
customarily in each instance: conferred with one or more of the parties to the
transaction or their agents; elicited in such conference what were considered to
be the pertinent facts; in the light of the information so elicited and the information contained in the abstract of title, selected and determined upon the
blank form or forms to be used; and then prepared one or more of the instruments mentioned in said paragraph numbered 5 by filling in such form or
forms in such manner as the defendant himself or the agent, servant or employee of the defendant preparing same, in his or her judgment, deemed proper
in the light of the information elicited in such conference and the information
contained in the abstract of title; and gave advice to the parties to such instruments as to legal effect of the instrument so prepared.
7. That the defendant was not a party to any of the deeds of conveyance
deeds of trust, mortgages, promissory notes, releases, receipts and options for
purchase, contracts of sale, agreements and other instruments prepared by him
or his agents, servants and employees as alleged in paragraph numbered 5
hereof, except that the deposit upon the purchase price,, the receipt of which
was acknowledged by each receipt and option for purchase, was paid to and
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held by the defendant as agent or broker; that the only connection of the defendant with the transactions, as a part of which said instruments were prepared and executed, was in the fact that the purchasers of the properties involved in such transactions had been procured by the defendant or that the
lender and the borrower had been brought together by the defendant and the
defendant received commissions for his services as a real estate broker in procuring such purchasers or in bringing together the lenders and the borrowers
and in the fact that the receipts and options recited that the deposit on the
purchase price was paid to and was to be held by the defendant as agent or
broker and in the performance by the defendant (either in his own person or
by his agents, servants and employees) of the services in the preparation of
said instruments and in the consummation or closing of the sale of or the loan
upon the real estate involved in the transactions; that, in some loan transactions, although the defendant was named in the promissory note and in the
deed of trust or mortgage as being the payee of such promissory note and
therefore appeared on the face of the said instruments to be a party to such
instruments, either the money loaned was the money of a principal for whom
the defendant was then acting and, shortly after the making of the loan, the
defendant endorsed and transferred the promissory note to his said principal
or it had, prior to the preparation and execution of said instruments, been
agreed between the defendant and a lending corporation that the defendant
should make the loan in his own name and should then endorse and transfer
the promissory note to the lending corporation and that the lending corporation should then repay to the defendant the amount so loaned and such agreement was carried out.
8. That, in almost all of the transactions in which the defendant and his
agents, servants and employees prepared legal instruments in the manner and
circumstances hereinbefore mentioned, the defendant had been employed as
a real estate broker to procure purchasers for the properties involved in the
transactions and had procured purchasers for such properties and had become
entitled to and was paid commissions for his services as a real estate broker
in procuring such purchasers, or the defendant had been employed as a real
estate broker to bring together the lender and the borrower and had brought
them together and had become entitled to and was paid commissions as a real
estate broker for doing so.
9. That, in the transactions in which the defendant and his agents, servants and employees prepared legal instruments in the manner and circumstances hereinbefore mentioned, the defendant made no charge for services
in preparing said instruments, other than his commission for procuring the
purchaser or for bringing together the lender and the borrower.
10. That the defendant is now continuing the unlawful practice of law
in the manner and circumstances hereinbefore set out and that, unless restrained by order of court, the defendant will continue such unlawful practice
of law.
11. That, under the statutes of the State of Colorado and the rules of the
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, no person is permitted to practice law
in the State of Colorado without having previously obtained a license for that
purpose from the said Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and that, under
such statutes, each person to whom such a license to practice law is issued
must, before being permitted to practice law in said State, take and subscribe
on oath or affirmation that he will support the Constitution of the United States
and of the State of Colorado and that he will in all things faithfully execute
the duties of an attorney and counselor at law according to the best of his
understanding and abilities. That, under the rules of the Supreme Court of the
State of Colorado, in order to receive such a license to practice law in the
State of Colorado, a person must submit proof of his moral and ethical qualifications and his moral and ethical qualifications must be examined into and
must be found satisfactory by the said Supreme Court, and, in addition thereto,
either he must have been admitted outside of the State of Colorado to the
practice of law by the highest court of the jurisdiction having such power and
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have practiced law in such jurisdiction for a specified number of years or he
must have successfully completed two years of work in an approved college or
university preliminary to the study of law and completed the three year
course of an approved law school and passed a rigid examination as to his
legal educational qualifications. That the practice of law in the State of Colorado is, and of right should be, confined to those persons who are so found
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to possess the necessary qualifications for the practice of law in said State and who satisfactorily meet the
tests and furnish proof of the qualifications required by the said statutes and
said rules of said Supreme Court.
12. That each of the plaintiffs Wm. Rann Newcomb and Lawrence A. Long
now is and for a number of years last past has been an attorney duly licensed
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law in the State of
Colorado and actually practicing law in said State with his office in the City
and County of Denver, Colorado. That the licenses which they and other attorneys have received to practice law in the State of Colorao are privileges and
franchises creating property rights in them and that the same have been and
are now being encroached upon and damaged by the unlawful practice of law
by the defendant in the manner and circumstances hereinbefore set out and
that, if such unlawful practice of law by the defendant is not restrained by
order of court, the said plaintiffs Wm. Rann Newcomb and Lawrence A. Long
as well as all other attorneys duly licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado and the public generally, will be greatly and irreparably damaged thereby.
13. That the interests of the public and particularly of those persons
owning, buying and selling real estate and those persons making and securing loans on real estate require that the persons who, pursuant to employment
prepare, in the State of Colorado, for others than themselves legal instruments
by which real estate and interests therein are conveyed, acquired, encumbered
released and otherwise affected shall be limited to those persons who have been
found by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to be qualified by their
education and moral and ethical qualifications to practice law in said State.
14. That plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
SECOND AND FURTHER CAUSE OF ACTION
AND, FOR A SECOND AND FURTHER CAUSE OF ACTION, The plaintiffs:
1. Adopt by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the First Cause of Action hereinbefore set out.
2. Allege that for many years last past the defendant has been engaged
in the unlawful practice of law in the State of Colorado by preparing for persons other than himself, as a practice and in numerous transactions, either
in his own persons or through his agents, servants and employees, leases of
real estate, notices terminating tenancy of real estate and demands to pay
rent or vacate real estate and other instruments creating, continuing, modifying or terminating the relation of landlord and tenant with respect to real
estate and by giving advice to the parties to such instruments as to the legal
effect thereof.
3. Allege that the defendant was not a party to any of the leases of real
estate, notices terminating tenancy of real estate and demands to pay rent or
vacate real estate and other instruments creating, continuing, modifying or
terminating the relation of landlord and tenant with respect to real estate
prepared by him or his agents, servants and employees as alleged in paragraph numbered 2 of this cause of action, except that, in some instances, the
defendant was, for convenience, named in said instruments as the lessor, although he did not then own any interest in the real estate which was the subject of said instruments and, in so doing, he was acting only as the agent of
the lessor. And allege that the only connection of the defendant with the transactions, as a part of which said instruments were prepared and executed, was
in the facts that the tenant had been procured by the defendant or that the
landlord and the tenant had been brought together by the defendant or that
the defendant had been employed by the owner of the real estate involved to
manage the said real estate and that the defendant received commissions or
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other form of compensation for his services as a real estate broker in procuring the tenant or in bringing together the landlord and the tenant or in managing the said real estate or that, as hereinbefore alleged, the defendant was.
for convenience, named in said instruments as the lessor, although he did not
then own any interest in the real estate involved and, in so doing, he was
acting only as agent for the lessor.
4. Allege that, in the transactions in which the defendant and his agents
servants and employee prepared legal instruments in the manner and circumstances mentioned in this cause of action, the defendant made no charge for
services in preparing said instruments, other than his commission or other
form of compensation for procuring the tenant or for bringing together the
landlord and the tenant or for managing the real estate.
5. Adopt by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
numbered 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the First Cause of Action hereinbefore set out.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court adjudge and decree that
the defendant has been and is unlawfully practicing law in the manner and
circumstances hereinbefore set out and that this Court grant an injunction
restraining and enjoining the defendant and his agents, servants and employees
from preparing, on behalf of other persons, deeds conveying real estate, deeds
of trust and mortgages encumbering real estate, promissory notes secured by
such deeds of trust or mortgages, releases of deeds of trust and mortgages
upon real estate, receipts and options for purchase, contracts of sale of real
estate and agreements relating to and affecting real estate and the title to real
estate, leases of real estate, notices terminating tenancy of real estate and
demands to pay rent or vacate real estate and other instruments creating, continuing, modifying or terminating the relation of landlord and tenant with
respect to real estate, or any of said instruments, whether or not the defendant charges or receives compensation for the same and whether or not the
defendant has been employed as a real estate broker by one of the parties tc
the transaction or has procured the purchaser or the seller of the real estate
involved or has brought together the lender and the borrower or the landlord
and the tenant or has been employed by the owner of the real estate involved
to manage the said real estate and whether or not the preparation of such legal
instruments is done by or under the supervision of an attoreny employed by
the defendant, and that plaintiffs have such other relief as to the Court shall
deem proper, besides the costs of this action.
PERCY S. MORRIS,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
715 Security Life Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado.
The address of the Plaintiff The Denver Bar Association,, a corporation, is
319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Denver 2, Colorado.

Wm. RANN NEWCOMB pro se,
722 Symes Building,
Denver 2, Colorado.

The address of the Plaintiff The Colorado Bar Association, a corporation, ir
319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Den
ver 2, Colorado.

LAWRENcE A. LONG pro se
418 Symes Building,
Denver 2, Colorado.

DAY GIVES EVENING LECTURES AT REGIS
Judge Edward C. Day, of the Denver District Court will
lecture from June 12 to August 3 on Employer-Employee Relationships and on Court Procedure in the summer evening classes
conducted by Regis College on the campus. Judge Day's course,
among the 30 being offered at Regis this summer, will be held from
6:30-8:20 on Tuesday and Thursday evenings.
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THE OPEN END MORTAGE*
C. BLAKE HIESTER
of the Denver Bar

Nearly every American, at some time in his life, comes in
contact with a mortgage instrument, and nearly every attorney
is faced with the problem, at some time, of deciding on the priority
of a mortgage instrument over some other mortgage instrument
or some different type of lien. I am endeavoring in this article to
deal with some aspects of a mortgage instrument which is designed
to maintain a priority in time over other liens. The instrument
concerned is know generally as an "Open End Mortgage." The
Architectural Forum has defined an open end mortgage as a mortgage instrument which provides for additional advances at a later
date, such advances to be covered by the original instrument.
In Colorado we deal generally with deeds of trust, but for the
convenience of language the term mortgage in this article shall
include a deed of trust, the term mortgagor shall include a grantor
of a deed of trust, and the term mortgagee shall include a beneficiary under a deed of trust.
The open end mortgage is generally desirable from the standpoint of borrowers and of lenders. Frequently a mortgage secures
an indebtedness which is paid back in small payments spread over
a long period of time. If the mortgage is an open end one, the
mortgagor can maintain and improve his mortgaged property, frequently his home, by borrowing further amounts from his original
lender which further amounts will be secured by his original mortgage. If the mortgage still has a period of several years to run,
the additional advance can be spread over the remaining years for
repayment, and the additional monthly amount to be repaid will be
relatively small. If these small payments are compared with the
average personal loan so often used for the purpose of repairing or
maintaining the home, or even with the FHA Title 1 loan which
must be repaid within a period of three years, the advantage of
the borrowing under the original open end mortgage can be readily
seen.
It is true that such maintenance or repairs can be made and
secured by a second mortgage, but the loan costs and higher interest
rate make this type of financing much less desirable from the borrower's standpoint. The advantage of an open end mortgage to a
lender can be appreciated if we will consider that his mortgage
becomes increasingly valuable with the increase in the value of the
security. A house which is kept in good order is better security
than one which is allowed to deteriorate rapidly because its owner
cannot afford necessary or desirable maintenance and repairs.
* This is an amplified version of a talk given by Mr. Heister before The Law Club
of Denver on March 26, 1951.
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Having briefly pointed out the advantages of the open end
mortgage, I shall devote the rest of this article to a discussion of
the protection such a mortgage gives to a lender. We have already
seen that an open end mortgage provides for additional advances
at a later date, and it is the protection given these additional advances which concerns us. It becomes immediately necessary,
therefore, to distinguish between the different types of advances.
Generally speaking we can, for our purposes here, divide such
additional advances into two types: those which are optional and
those which are obligatory. The attempts of the courts to define
these two concepts have caused much confusion on this subject.
The courts have defined an optional advance in the following ways:
It is optional if: (1) the mortgagee is not obligated to make it, or
(2) he cannot make it without the request of the mortgagor, or (3)
he may at his pleasure decline to make it, and may do so without
taking the risk of subjecting himself to damages or loss. The third
of these definitions seems the best, for reasons which will be seen
later, and is gaining favor with the courts. The courts have generally defined an obligatory advance in one of two ways: (1) the
future advance is obligatory if the mortgagee has agreed absolutely to make the advance, or (2) the mortgagee must make the
future advance in order to eliminate loss. The second of these
definitions seems the more reasonable and is gaining favor with
the courts.
THE PRIORITY OF FUTURE ADVANCES

From the standpoint of the number of jurisdictions deciding
the question there appears to be a majority and a minority doctrine
concerning the priority of future advances made under an open
end mortgage over intervening encumbrances. Since the recording
statutes of this state and of many states would resolve the question
of priority between liens one of which is not recorded, we shall
assume hereafter that all liens claiming priority have been recorded, and an intervening encumbrance means one that was
recorded prior to the making of an additional advance.
The rule laid down in most jurisdictions is that an advance,
though purely optional, made pursuant to a mortgage of which
subsequent parties had record or other sufficient notice is a lien
or charge superior to an encumbrance intervening between the
giving of the mortgage and the making of the advance, if the
mortgagee had no knowledge and no actual notice of the intervening encumbrance. It is to be observed that such rule, where
actually applied, has usually been invoked to deny effect to mere
record notice of the intervening encumbrance without the sufficiency of any other form of constructive notice having been at
issue.'
1 In

support of this doctrine see the cases cited in 138 A-L.R. 579 et seq.
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The Colorado Supreme Court followed the reasoning of this
majority doctrine in deciding the case of Du Bois v. First National
Bank.2 That case was briefly the following: One Du Bois was
indebted to the First National Bank of Denver in the sum of about
$7,000.
As collateral security therefore and for all advances
thereafter to be made to him by the bank he executed his promissory note in the sum of $25,000 secured by a trust deed on real
estate. From time to time therafter Du Bois obtained further loans
from the bank and gave renewal notes for them on the earlier
indebtedness. Subsequent to the making of the note, Du Bois and
his wife were divorced, and in the divorce decree the wife -was
awarded one-third interest in the real estate. After this award to
the wife, the bank paid advances to Du Bois under the original
mortgage. Du Bois defaulted in payment and the bank secured
a decree of foreclosure on its deed of trust. The wife seeks to
have this foreclosure set aside as to her one-third interest in the
property. The court held for the bank and against the wife. In
answer to the wife's contention that the trust deed is not a security
upon her portion of the property for advances made by the bank
to her husband after the maturity of the collateral note, or after
she acquired her interest therein under the divorce decree, and that
the rendition of the decree and the recording of her deed, which
was made in pursuance thereof, operated as constructive notice to
the bank of her rights, the court said:
No question is made concerning the validity of the mortgage to
cover future advances, and it is now well settled that the mortgage
need not state on its face that such was its purpose. It may be silent
as to that feature or it may specify a fixed sum for which the security
is given, and advances within such limit are protected; the amount
as well as the purpose of the security being established by oral evidence. The position of the bank is that until she gave to it actual
notice of the acquisition of her interest in the property it might continue to make advances to the mortgagor, even after maturity of the
mortgage notes, since the mortgage did not restrict the time within
which the advances were being made which would be protected by
the mortgage as to the entire property. The Trial Court apparently
adopted the view of the law entertained by plaintiffs and also found
as a fact that all advances which the bank made to Du Bois were
made before defendant gave notice of her rights. If such is the fact
it would seem from the authorities that such advances are within
the lien of the mortgage.

It cannot be said that this was the actual decision because the
court goes on to state that under the facts of this case that question
is not a live one because the foreclosure sale did not bring in
sufficient money to cover all the bank's advances. The case is frequently cited, however, for the proposition quoted.
In a more recent Colorado case, Ferguson v. Mueller,3 under
facts similar to the above case in that the subsequent owners of
243

Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908).

S 1 1 5 Colo. 139, 169 P. 2d 610 (1946).
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property subject to a deed of trust were concerned, the court discusses the law of open end mortgages as follows: When a mortgage
in turn secures future advances, the sum named as the consideration is of no importance, because as between the parties it will be
security for the money actually advanced upon it and for nothing
more. The court said that no question is made concerning the
validity of the mortgage to cover future advances, and it is now
well-settled that the mortgage need not state on its face that such
was its purpose. It may be silent as to that feature or it may
specify a fixed sum for which a security is given, and advances
within such limit are protected, the amount as well as the purpose
of the security being established by oral evidence. The court cites
Du Bois v. First National Bank, supra.
ACTUAL NOTICE REQUIRED, NOT JUST RECORDING

So we see that, according to the majority doctrine, actual
notice of the intervening encumbrance must be had by the mortgagee making future advances in order to subject his future advances to the priority of the intervening encumbrance. There is
much confusion as to what constitutes notice for this purpose, but
the cases do generally hold that the mere recording of the intervening encumbrance does not constitute notice sufficient to subject
the future advance made under an open end mortgage to the intervening encumbrance. The above cited and other Colorado cases
have held that the mere recording of the intervening encumbrance4
is not notice to establish priority of an intervening encumbrance.
Some cases have held that actual notice necessary to establish priority of an intervening encumbrance over an optional advance must
be the personal contacting by the intervening encumbrancer of the
mortgagee seeking to make future advances.
According to the generally prevailing doctrine, advances made
under a recorded mortgage given to secure optional advances will
not be denied priority in lien merely because the intervening encumbrancer could not have determined from the mortgage without
extraneous inquiry the true amount of the indebtedness or advances
secured thereby.5
The majority doctrine discussed above is further clarified and
enlarged upon in Jones on Mortgages as follows:
Generally the amount intended to be advanced need not be stated,
provided it can be otherwise ascertained by the description. But even
where limitation is necessary in order to constitute a continuing
security, which will not be affected by subsequent conveyances, a
recorded mortgage for an unlimited sum is notice to a subsequent
encumbrancer as to all sums advanced upon the mortgage before the
subsequent lien attaches. Moreover, the record of the subsequent
mortgage is no notice to such prior mortgagee, that any subsequent
See also 138 A.L.R. 585.

5Op. cit. at 582.
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lien has attached. A subsequent mortgagee can limit the credit that
may be safely given under the mortgage for future advances only by
giving the holder of it express notice of his lien, and a notice also that
he must make no future advances on the credit of that mortgage. The
mortgage will then stand as security for the real equitable claims of
the mortgagee, whether they existed at the date of the mortgage or
arose afterward, but prior to the receipt of such notice. If such
mortgagee is not under any obligation to make advances, and after
notice of a subsequent mortgage does make further advances, to the
extent of such advances the subsequent mortgagee has the right of
precedence. But if such mortgagee is under obligation to make the
advances, he is entitled to the security, whatever may be the encumbrances subsequently made upon the property, and whether he
has notice of them or not.

Citing the proposition generally, again, Jones on Mortgages
says the following:6
In this country, mortgages made in good faith for the purpose
of securing future debts have generally been sustained, both in
the early and in the recent cases. Such a mortgage is valid even as
against creditors and subsequent purchasers. It does not matter
that the future advances are to be made to a third person, or for his
benefit at the request of a mortgagor. Neither is the validity of a
mortgage to secure future advances affected by the fact that the
advances are to be made in materials for building instead of money.
A mortgage is not fraudulent because it is given for a larger amount
than the actual loan made at the time, with a view to its covering
future loans up to the amount of the mortgage. Nor is the creation
of subsequent valid indebtedness a fraudulent act, regardess of motive,
if the mortgage secures future advances.

In contrast with this majority doctrine, the doctrine of a few
cases (most of them not recently decided) provides that the lien
of a so-called optional advance made without actual notice of an encumbrance intervening between the giving of the mortgage and the
making of the advance, is subordinate to such encumbrance, except,
of course, as a failure to record the intervening encumbrance may
have produced a contrary result. The substance of this doctrine is
that, for priority purposes, the optional advance is to be treated
as a new mortgage taken as of the time of the advance.
PRIORITY OF OBLIGATORY ADVANCE

We have discussed thus far the priority of additional optional
advances. Today's expanded building programs and large scale
building projects make for many of us the problem of the obligatory advance even more acute, particularly where it applies to
construction money paid out under the security of an original
mortgage where the lender advances sums of money as the building
progresses. If under the terms of the original mortgage, the
lender has to advance sums to pay for work and materials during
the progress of the building, he is operating under an open end
mortgage which provides for obligatory future advances. Jones
6 Section 448.
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on Mortgages, Sec. 454 states the general law with regard to a
mortgage for obligatory advances as follows:
A mortgage for obligatory advances is a lien from its execution.
If, by the terms of the mortgage, an obligation is imposed upon the
mortgagee to make the advances, the mortgage will remain security
for all the advances he is required to make, although other encumbrances may be put upon the property before they are made, and he
has knowledge of such encumbrances.

The effect and extent of the above doctrine is brought out in
Tillinghast v. North End Savings Bank.7 That case was, briefly,
the following: Upon a first mortgage to secure a building loan of
$20,000, a bank advanced $15,000 and retained $5,000, under an
agreement with the mortgagor that the latter sum should not be
paid "until the said building shall be in such progress to completion that the mortgagee shall deem it safe to advance said balance."
A second mortgagee acquired the equity in the property by foreclosure, and brought a bill to redeem it from the first mortgage.
The bank had paid out the whole of the $5,000 retained by it upon
orders from the mortgagor, leaving the amount of $450 due to it
for interest. It was contended by the second mortgagee that the
bank ought to have applied the amount of $450 to the payment
of this interest from the $5,000 retained by it, and could not
require that sum to be paid by the second mortgagee in redeeming
from the bank's mortgage. It was held that the bank could not
be compelled to make such set-off.
OBLIGATORY ADVANCES V. MECHANICS'

LIENS

The application of the doctrine stated above concerning the
priority of future obligatory advances becomes important especially, in many cases, when confronted with the priority of the
mechanics' lien laws. A mortgage for future advances has, in
cases where the making of such advances was apparently obligatory, been held to be a prior mortgage and the mortgagee to be a
prior bona fide mortgagee, and its lien has been held not to be one
attaching or originating subsequently to the commencement of the
work, within the meaning of the provisions of mechanics' lien laws
fixing the relative priority of such liens and other encumbrances
on the property. The right of a mortgagee for future advances
to priority over mechanics' liens for advances made during the
progress of the work is sometimes a matter of balancing conflicting
equities. When the mortgage money is to be advanced and used
for the carrying on of the work, and the lien claimants have
furnished labor or materials with actual or constructive notice
thereof, the mortgagee is ordinarily deemed entitled to priority.
A Colorado case is enlightening on this matter. The case of
Joralmon v. McPhee s was, briefly, the following: A Mrs. Snell
7178 Mass. 458, 459, 59 N.E. 1016 (1901).
831 Colo. 26, 71 P. 419 (1903).
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owned land subject to two mortgages, the second of which was for
the benefit of Mrs. O'Donnell. Mrs. Snell wanted to have improvements erected on the land and contracted with two gentlemen
named Tooker and Joralmon to perform this work. Mrs. O'Donnell
agreed to allow Joralmon and Tooker to have deeds of trust prior
to hers on the condition that the money loaned by Tooker and by
Joralmon would be used first to pay off the first mortgage and
second to pay for the improvements to be erected on the land. All
parties having agreed to this, Mrs. O'Donnell released her deed
of trust. Mrs. Snell then signed promissory notes to Tooker, another to Joralmon and a third to Mrs. O'Donnell. Deeds of trust
were executed and recorded in that priority. The money advanced
by Tooker and Joralmon was used partly to pay off the first encumbrance as agreed upon and $2,770.10 was used to pay for the
construction of improvements on the property. The improvements
were not completed and and contractors, laborers, and materialmen filed mechanics' liens which they were seeking to have foreclosed. The main question raised, in which we are interested, is
that of the priority of the various liens. As to the funds which
had been loaned prior to the commencement of the building and
which was secured by deeds of trust on record prior to the commencement of the building, the court stated that any mechanics'
liens were obviously second to such mortgages to that extent. The
real question with which we are concerned, is this, therefore, part
of the money advanced by Joralmon and Tooker was advanced
subsequent to the commencement of the building and the furnishing of materials. The court held that to the extent of the money
secured by these mortgages, which was actually extended for the
construction of the improvements, the mortgages of Tooker and
Joralmon were prior to the mechanics' liens. In holding this the
court said:
Where mechanics and material-men have notice of the existence
of a mortgage, which is given expressly for the purpose of securing
funds to construct an improvement and to know that the funds thus
obtained are being applied in that way, their rights must be held
subordinate to that of the mortgagee to the extent of such advances
because of this knowledge. In other words, when they know that a
structure upon which they are engaged has been pledged as security
for advances to be applied toward its construction by a contract
entered into before the work of erection was commenced they are
bound by such an arrangement up to the extent that funds under such
contract are actually advanced and applied to construct the building.
So, where the advances are all made before the work is done, or
material furnished the equity of the mortgagee is superior to that of
the lien claimant.

After having determined generally what the law is with respect to the priority of the lien of a mortgage for future advances
it becomes important to know what amounts to a mortgage for
future advances. Obviously a mortgage instrument which de-
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scribes, in clear language, that it secures a specifically mentioned
indebtedness plus additional advances of certain amounts or up to
a certain amount is such a mortgage. As to those mortgages which
are not absolutely clear I can but cite examples of some which
were adjudicated to be mortgages for future advances and those
which were adjudicated not to be and let the reader decide for
himself how best to word such a mortgage.0
CASES ON MORTGAGES FOR FUTURE ADVANCES

An Arkansas case decided that a mortgage which provides
that it shall be security for a debt of $100.00 to mature in the
future, "and all other indebtedness which may then be due" to the
mortgagee by the mortgagor will cover future advances."
A California case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage
to secure "all moneys due or hereafter to become due" does not
relate merely to existing indebtedness, but secures future loans
and advances as well.
An Iowa case is cited for the proposition that a conditional
deed, containing a clause providing that the property shall be
reconveyed on the payment of the grantee of a "sum of money
equal to all claims and evidences of indebtedness that the grantee
shall have against" the grantor may be a mortgage for future
advances.
A Maine case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage purporting to secure the repayment of a certain amount and "also all
other debts which the mortgagor may contract with the mortgagee"
will cover future advances.
A Michigan case is cited for the proposition that the fact that
a mortgage recites a stated consideration does not prevent it from
being a mortgage to cover future advances, where the mortgagor
covenants to repay such sum and also "any sum of money which
he may now or hereafter owe said mortgagee by reason of any
note, check, draft or other paper upon which his name shall appear,
either as maker or otherwise; and this mortgage and its accompanying note, until discharged, is to be a continuing security for
payment of any such sum or sums."
An Illinois case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage
given to secure monthly installments of rents, to become due in
the future, is not one to secure future optional advances, although
the landlord, under the terms of the lease, was entitled to terminate it upon non-payment of any installment of rent.
Another Maine case is cited for the fact that a bill of sale
given to one "as security for his liability upon certain notes" endorsed by him, the amount of which is not given, does not cover
future liability by endorsement.
'The specific citations for the cases mentioned can be found in 1 A.L.R. 1586.
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A Minnesota case is cited for the proposition that a mortgage
which recites that it is given as collateral security for the payment
of certain book accounts, "according to the terms of a certain
contract bearing even date herewith," which did not provide for
future advances to the mortgagor, cannot be treated as one for
future advances.
As a general rule, advances in excess of the amount of a
mortgage are not secured by it; however, it is stated that a limitation in terms of the amount of the advances to be made may be
controlled by other expressions in the mortgage as to the purpose
of the advances; thus where the controlling purpose was to secure
advances sufficient to enable the mortgagor to raise a crop of cotton
advances beyond the sum specified were protected.
A wider understanding of the open end mortgage and the
protection it gives a lender might lead to better and easier home
development and maintenance, and might resolve many questions
concerning the relative safety of making advances under an existing mortgage.

SUPREME COURT ADOPTS AMENDMENTS TO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
On May 17, 1951, the Supreme Court of Colorado announced the approval of the amendments to the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure embodied in the reports of its
Rules Committee submitted on September 1, 1948 and January 4, 1950.
The effective date of the amendments will be August
18, 1951 and sometime prior thereto Dicta and the bar associations hope to publish and have in your hands a copy of
these amendments.
Some 37 of the amendments were made to bring the
Colorado Rules into conformity with the 1947 changes to
the Federal Rules, two amendments were made to the Appendix of Forms for the same purpose, and eleven other
amendments were approved in accordance with the recommendations of the committee.
The Rules Committee of the Supreme Court is composed of Jean S. Breitenstein, chairman; Joseph G. Hodges,
V. H. Johnson, Thomas Keely, and Percy S. Morris.

June, 1951

DICTA

THE "PRUDENT MAN RULE" NOW APPLIES TO
INVESTMENTS BY FIDUCIARIES
CHARLES A. BAER
of the Denver Bar

Colorado has had in its Constitution a prohibition against the
investment of funds held in estates and trusts in the stocks or
bonds of private corporations.' At the last general election, there
was included in Constitutional Amendment No. 2 a provision which
permitted the General Assembly to enact legislation
by which
2
fiduciaries might invest in such stocks and bonds.
The legislature, in pursuance of this provision of Constitutional Amendment No. 2 enacted, and the Governor signed, H.B.
272. The Governor's signature was affixed on March 29, 1951. The
statutes of the State of Colorado, therefore, now contain this par-3
ticular bill as well as previous statutes relating to investments.
The statute adopted by our legislature is one which might be
referred to as a model "Prudent Man Rule" type of investment
statute. Colorado, according to my information, is the 25th state
having the prudent man rule by judicial construction or by statute, many of them similar to that referred to. In no state where
such a statute has been adopted has there been a return to the
old type of investment practice which we have followed in Colorado for many years, namely, the enactment of a legal list by our
legislature or by the creation of a commission which adopts a legal
list for the guidance of fiduciaries. Even where the legal list has
been in existence, the courts have, in considering the propriety of
particular investments, surcharged or refused to surcharge the
fiduciary on what might be called the "Prudent Man Rule" of
conduct. Some courts have held that a purchase within the legal
list removed the filuciary from liability for investing improperly.
Of course these cases arise where the asset purchased by the
fiduciary has depreciated in value through some set of events.
However, in most such cases there are other factors involved, such
as self-dealing, improper appraisals and holding improperly after
receipt of information, which indicates that the investment is improper and of questionable value.
12 COLO.
CONST. Art. V, § 36.
The General Assembly shall from time to time enact laws prescribing types or
classes of Investments where the investment of funds held by executors, administrators,
guardians, conservators and other trustees, whose power of investment is not set out in
the instrument creating the trust.
aStatutes as of April 13, 1951 were all in COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 176: Sec. 126-repealed 1937 ; Sec. 126(1)-repealed as to (c) 1945 (Exec., etc.) ; repealed as to (b)
1951 fiduciaries, still effective as to (a) ; See. 126 (2)-repealed as to executors, administrators, guardians, trustees 1945 ; still effective as to all others named; Sec. 126

(3)-

repealed as to (c) 1945 ; repealed as to (b) 1951 ; still effective as to (a) ; Sec. 126 (4)
-repealed except as to its use in conjunction with Sec. 13 Chapter 235 Session Laws of
Colo. (Uniform Veteran Guardianship Act) applying to minors and incompetents receiving benefits from V.A.
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The question then is, "What is the Prudent Man Rule?" From
talking with many attorneys here in Denver, and in Colorado, I
realize that there are many different notions of what those words
mean. There are even some who feel that the adoption of this
statute amounts to a general invitation to carelessness in trust
investments, especially where individuals are acting as fiduciaries.
However, it is my belief that this is not so; rather, that the adoption of this statute imposes upon fiduciaries a higher degree of
care and skill in investing than that which we have had previously.
As long ago as 1830, Mr. Justice Putnam in the case of Harvard
College v. Amory, the basic decision from which the American
rule evolves, said:
He [the fiduciary] is to observe how men of prudence, discretion,
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable 4 income as well as the probable safety of the
capital to be invested.

Very much the same wording is to be found in other early
cases, 5 and there is quite a lengthy statement on the rule in Scott
on Trusts, Section 227. The Restatement of the Law on Trusts
reads as follows:
(Section 227). In making investments of trust funds the trustee
is under a duty to the beneficiary;
(a) In the absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or
statute otherwise providing, to make such investments and only
such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property.
having primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the
amount and regularity of the income to be derived.

It is my belief that the fiduciary is not ordinarily bound to the
highest degree of care, but only to the degree of care used by the
reasonably prudent man. This is so in investments even though in
other matters a fiduciary is held to strict accountability. It is quite
different from and lower than the level or quality of honesty required of a fiduciary.
The purpose of this article is only to acquaint you with the
passage of this statute and not to answer all the questions which
might immediately occur to you. From conversations I have had
with the deans of our law schools, I am sure that we will have
articles in Dicta and The Rocky Mountain Law Review covering
comprehensively the problems presented. It might be well, however, to mention some of the problems which face us:
1. The Prudent Man Rule is without doubt the rule of investment to follow in all guardianships and conservatorships other
than those in which funds are received from the Veterans Administration.
4Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick 446, 461, (Mass. 1830).
5King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 (1869) ; Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 A. 1004
(1892).
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2. The Prudent Man Rule undoubtedly should be used in investing in all cases where the will is silent on the problem.
3. The Prudent Man Rule should be followed in conjunction
with Section 147, Chapter 176, in holding investments in any estate
where the will is silent or in any estate where there is no will.
4. In all trusts created under contract, and in all testamentary trusts, reappraisal of the investment problem and of the
investment clause must be made. The rule does not limit the express provisions of such trusts, but rather should be read in connection therewith, just as it should have been before the passage
of the statute in connection with those accounts wherein the trustee
was given unlimited discretion in the investing of the funds. Typical as examples of such problems are clauses as follows:
(a) To "invest and reinvest" where undoubtedly the rule now
applies.
(b) To "invest and reinvest in safe, interest bearing securities" where undoubtedly the rule applies within the limits of what
are interest bearing securities such as bonds and notes.
(c) To "invest and reinvest in those securities prescribed as
legal by the State of Colorado" wherein the rule undoubtedly applies to investments made after March 29.
(d) To "invest and reinvest in Government bonds, municipal
bonds, and loans secured by a first mortgage on Colorado real estate
not in excess of 50% of the value of such real estate" wherein the
rule probably does not apply except insofar as it is superimposed
in purchasing the municipal bonds and the mortgages.
The cases on these points are decided.by the courts under the rules
of construction regarding intent of the testator.
5. It also presents a problem to the draftsmen of new wills
and trust agreements. In my opinion such draftsmen should, as in
the past, incorporate in the trust instrument a complete investment
clause setting forth the ideas and desires of the testator or trustor
and limiting or giving discretion to the trustee as desired. The
well-drawn trust instrument does not rely on the changing conditions of our economy or of the ideas of our legislature.
6. The attorney for a fiduciary must now advise his client
that in investing funds such client must investigate with the care
and skill of ordinary prudent men from the sources which such
men use whether the asset to be purchased is proper for the particular fund. One therefore doesn't buy particular investments
from a salesman on the word of the salesman alone unless such
individual has a knowledge of the facts and conditions separate
and apart from that of the salesman.
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LIEBHARDT V. AVISON: REMAINDERS
AND REVISION
Three types of remainders will be involved in this comment
on Liebhardt v. Avison: 1
1. "To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs."
2. "To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, if B survives A."
3. "To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, but if B dies
before A, then to C and his heirs."
The opinion bases the decision upon the distinction between
type 1 and type 2. It would have been more orthodox had the same
decision been based upon the distinction between type 1 and type 3.
Type 1 is a vested remainder in fee simple absolute. Type 2 is a
contingent remainder, that is, B's survivorship is a condition
precedent to the vesting of the estate in him. Type 3 is a vested
remainder subject to divestment by an executory limitation, that
is, B's failure to survive A is an event which will divest the fee
simple which has been vested in him.
The significance of the distinction between type 2 and type
3 has been stated by the American Law Institute as follows:2
...In some controversies the rule stated [§250 (d)] becomes important because of the difference in the rules applicable respectively to
future interests subject to a condition precedent [type 2] and to future
interests vested subject to complete defeasance [type 3]. This situation exists often in problems of taxation; in questions involving the
destructive operation of the rule against perpetuities; in determining
the possibility of merger between a present interest and a remainder;
in determining whether the interest in question is accelerated upon
the failure of a prior interest, in ascertaining the person entitled to
receive otherwise undisposed of income and in deciding the type of
protection to be accorded to the future interest . . . also . . . in determining the type of reversionary interest left in the conveyor . . .

When such cases have to be decided in Colorado, the opinion
in Liebhardt v. Avison may lead to unorthodox results because it
classifies as contingent remainders [type 2], remainders which,
it is believed, should have been classified as vested subject to divestment [type 3].
The court was using "...
the rule of construction which we
applied in Williams v. Fundingsland, 74 Colo. 315, 321, 221 Pac.
1084, that, 'The use of different words in a will applying to the
same subject matter, indicates that the testator had in view different results'."
'-Colo.-,
229 P. 2d 933 (1951).
The case is not stated because it is assumed
that the reader of this comment has read the opinion.
' RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1940)

§ 250, Comment J.
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This rule was used by the court as a reason for concluding
that since in paragraphs 15 (a), 15 (b), and 16 (b) the testator
used words which created (type 2) contingent remainders, he intended something different, that is, a (type 1) vested remainder
in fee simple absolute, by the different words of paragraph 16 (c).
The same rule could have been used to the same effect, but
with less risk of leading to error in subsequent cases, if the court
had concluded that since in paragraphs 15 (a), 15 (b), and 16
(b) the testator used words which created (type 3) vested remainders subject to divestment by executory limitations, he intended something different, that is, a (type 1) vested remainder
in fee simple absolute, by the different words of paragraph 16 (c).
Paragraphs 15 (a) and (b) will be studied first. There are
five reasons why the remainder which it creates should be classified as (type 3) vested subject to divestment by an executory
limitation.
First: The remainder is "to the issue of Georgia . . . living
at the time of my [the testator's] death . .. ". The identity of each
remainderman was therefore as definitely determined at the death
of the testator as it would have been had he said, "to John,
This
James, and Mary, the children of my niece Georgia."
"present identification" of existing persons as the intended takers
of the remainder tends to establish that survival until the time of
distribution is not a condition precedent.3
Moreover, the express requirement that the remaindermen
be living at a certain time indicates that no such requirement is
to be implied as of a later time. This follows from the rule of
construction which the court was applying. With reference to the
time of his death, the testator used words requiring survivorship;
with reference to the time of distribution, he did not. "The use of
different words in a will applying to the same subject matter, indicates that the testator had in view different results."
Second: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the words, "Upon the death of both Harry . . . and Georgia"
in the same property
is nullified by the the fact that life estates
4
had been given to Harry and to Georgia.
Third: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the words, "when they reach the age of twenty-six years" is
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 256, Comment c.
§ 74, note 26, citing twenty-six
SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936)
cases, (a list "by no means exhaustive") including Dowd v. Scally (Iowa) 174 N.W.

938, 940 (1919),

"If there be any one proposition in the law of remainders which may

be regarded as settled, it

is the

one here

stated.

'.

.

. Where the

devise is

to the

remainderman "from and after" or "after" or "at" or "on" the death of the life tenant,
or words of like import are used, the authorities

quite generally

declare that such

words relate to the time of enjoyment, and that the remainder is vested.' "
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nullified by the gift of income from the same property to the same
persons until they reach the age of twenty-six years. 5
Fourth: The words "I give to the issue of Georgia ...living
at the time of my death ... for their absolute property when they
reach the age of 26" afford the basis for inference that the gift
was vested under the rule in Clobberie's Case, ". . . if money
be given to one, to be paid at the age of twenty-one years; there,
if the party dies before, it shall go to [his] executor."'7 Thus the
vesting is immediate, only the enjoyment is postponed.
The same effect should be given to a subsequent phrase, "before receiving the fee title to said real estate and before receiving the principal of said property protective fund and the accumulations thereof." This is paraphrased in the opinion as, "before
receiving the trust property." It is believed that this is a correct
paraphrase. "Recieving the title to said real estate" seems to
refer not to the vesting of the interest, but rather to receiving
the legal title from the trustees; and so also as to receiving the
personal property which had been held in trust.
Furthermore, the term "absolute property" seems more properly to point to a distinction between property that is absolute
(type 1) and property that is subject to defeasance (type 3),
rather than to a distinction between absolute property (type 1)
and no property at all (type 2).
Fifth: The gift over "in case of Georgia ['s] issue living at
my death dying without issue before reaching the age of twentysix years" strongly indicates a vested interest subject to divestment (type 3).
The testator has said that there shall be a gift over if the
remaindermen die without issue before reaching twenty-six. But
what if they die with issue before twenty-six? In such an event
there is no gift over. The inference is that the interest has already
been vested and that it will be a part of of the estate of the
remainderman. 8
It is hoped that this discussion will have pointed out the significance of the italicized words in paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
5 RESTATEMENT, supra, § 258, Comment m, "The rule stated in this section is one
of the most potent factors in construction. . . . when this rule is applicable a condition
precedent of survival is thereby eliminated unless extremely strong counterbalancing
factors are present . . the rule is sufficient to change the effect of limitation, which
apart from the gift of income would clearly include a condition precedent of survival."
SMES, supra, § 356, note 44, citing seventeen cases, including Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Rowland, 132 A. 673 (N.J., 1926). ". . . $50,000 in trust . . . to . . . apply
net income to maintenance, support and education of Charles . . . until he attain the
age of thirty years, and upon [Charles] attaining the age of thirty years, I give
[Charles] . . . principal sum of $50,000."

"The authorities are agreed in holding that legacies in terms of the one under

consideration are vested. .
. The trustee is advised that the legacy vested in Charles
. . . and upon his death passed to his administrators . . . although [Charles] would
not now be thirty had he lived."
82 Vent. 342 (1677).

See also in accord, with respect to land as well as to personalty: RESTATEMENT,
supra, § 257, particularly illustration 1, and SIMES, supra, § 355, note 37, citing fifteen
cases.
8RESTATEMENT,
$
supra,
§ 254, particularly, illustration 3 and comment b, "The
force of the tendency stated in [§ 254a, that 'the restricted requirement of survival

Is a basis for the defeasance of such interest rather than a condition precedent
thereof] is very strong, being counteracted only in rare situations."
SIMES, supra.
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(a) The net income of said real estate I give, devise and bequeath
to Harry G. Liebhardt and Georgia Liebhardt Temple, share and share
alike, for their natural lives.
Upon and after ten (10) years from the date of my death, the
net income from the said property protective fund and the accumulations thereof I give, devise and bequeath to Harry G. Liebhardt
and Georgia Liebhardt Temple, for their natural lives, share and
share alike.
In the event that Harry G. Liebhardt dies before Georgia Liebhardt Temple, then and in that event the entire net income of the
said property protective fund and the accumulations thereof, after
ten (10) years from the date of my death, and the entire net income
of said real estate, I give, devise and bequeath to Georgia Liebhardt
Temple, for her natural life.
Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, either before or
after the death of Harry G. Liebhardt, her share of said net income
of said real estate and of the said property protective fund and the
accumulations thereof, I give, devise and bequeath to her issue living
at the time of my death, share and share alike.
All of said income herein bequeathed and devised shall be paid
to the beneficiaries quarter-annually.
Upon the death of both Harry G. Liebhardt and Georgia Liebhardt
Temple, all of said above described real estate and the income therefrom, and the said property protective fund and the accumulations
thereof, I give, devise and bequeath to the issue of Georgia Liebhardt Temple living at the time of my death, share and share alike,
for their absolute property, when they reach the age of twenty-six
(26) years.
(b) Upon the death of said Harry G. Liebhardt and Georgia
Liebhardt Temple, and in case of Georgia Liebhardt Temple's issue
living at the time of my death dying without issue before reaching
the age of twenty-six (26) years and before receiving the fee title
to said real estate and before receiving the principal of said property
protective fund and the accumulations thereof, then the share of the
income theretofore received by said issue of Georgia Liebhardt Temple
I give, devise and bequeath, as follows: one-half thereof to the German Protestant Churches of Denver, Colorado and the English
Lutheran Churches of Denver, Colorado, share and share alike, and
the other one-half thereof to the Evangelical Lutheran Sanitarium
located in Jefferson County, Colorado. If said German Protestant
Churches of Denver have ceased to exist, then the said share of said
income bequeathed to them I give, devise and bequeath to said English
Lutheran Churches of Denver, share and share alike.

With respect to this part of the will the court said, "It thus
becomes evident . . . that he [testator] could, and did, by apt
language, defer the vesting of a remainder to a time subsequent
to his own death, making such vesting dependent upon the survival of the remaindermen until such time, and direct the disposition of the remainder in the event of the death of the remaindermen prior to the time fixed for such vesting. We can only conclude that the testator himself had fully in mind the difference
between a contingent [type 2] and a vested [type 1] remainder."
It would have involved less risk of error in future cases if
the court had said, " It thus becomes evident . . . that he [testator] could, and did, by apt language provide for the divesting
of a remainder at a time subsequent to his own death, making
such divestment dependent upon the failure of the remaindermen
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to survive until such time, and direct the disposition of the interest in the event of the remaindermen without issue prior to
the time fixed. We can only conclude that the testator himself had
fully in mind the difference between an absolutely vested remainder [type 1] and a remainder subject to divestment [type 3].
So far this comment has been confined to the court's reference
to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b). The same sort of comment should
be made concerning the court's reference to paragraph 16 (b). The court treats paragraph 16 (b) as a type 2 contingent
remainder, whereas it would have been orthodox to treat it as a
type 3 vested remainder subject to divestment by an executory
limitation. There are four reasons for this conclusion.
First: The remainderman is identified (by name) at the
death of the testator.9
Second: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the phrase, "Upon the death of Georgia," is explained by
referring it to that part of the property in which Georgia had
been given an estate for life.' 0
Third: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the words, "when . . . Jack . . . shall have reached the age
of thirty years," is nullified by the gift of income, part to be paid
to him, and the excess to be accumulated for him until he reached
the age of thirty. 11 The rule is the same even12 though only a part
of the income is to be given for maintenance.
Fourth: The gift over "upon the death of Jack ... without
issue, before being entitled to receive and before receiving said
property" justifies the inference that an interest has been vested
in Jack upon the death of the testator, and that it 3is to be divested only by his death before thirty, without issue.'
The language of paragraph 16 (b) is as follows: (The
words which have been discussed are italicized.)
Upon the death of both Minnie K. Liebhardt and Laura L. Liebhardt, I give, devise and bequeath the net income of the undivided
one-half interest in and to said Lots seventeen (17), eighteen (18)
and nineteen (19), Block one hundred sixty-one (161), East Denver,
to my niece, Georgia Liebhardt Temple, for and during her natural
life and to her son Jack Liebhardt Temple, share and share alike,
to be paid as hereinafter provided. The share of said net income
belonging to Georgia Liebhardt Temple shall be paid to her by said
successors in trust quarter-annually. The share of said net income
belonging to Jack Liebhardt Temple shall be paid to him by said
successors in trust at the rate of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00)
per month, until he reaches the age of twenty-six (26) years, and
between the age of twenty-six (26) and thirty (30) years, the said
share of said net income shall be paid to him by said successors in
trust at the rate of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month.
The excess of said net income belonging to Jack Liebhardt Temple
over and above said Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month,
and over and above said Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month,
respectively, shall be invested and held in trust for him by said
OSee Supra, first reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
10See Supra, first reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
"See Supra, third reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
12SIMES, supra, § 356, note 45.
USee Supra, fifth reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
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sucessors in trust until he reaches the age of thirty (30) years, and
when he reaches the age of thirty (30) years, said excess of income,
and the accumulations thereof, shall he paid to him as his own
property.
Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and when said
Jack Liebhardt Temple shall have reached the age of thirty (30)
years, then the entire undivided one-half interest in and to said Lots
seventeen (17), eighteen (18) and nineteen (19), Block one hundred
sixty-one (161), East Denver, shall be turned over and conveyed to
said Jack Liebhardt Temple as and for his absolute property.
Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and upon -the
death of Jack Liebhardt Temple without issue, before being entitled
to receive and before receiving said property as above provided,
then the net income of said undivided one-half interest in said Lots
seventeen (17), eighteen (18) and nineteen (19), Block one hundred
sixty-one (161), East Denver, shall be distributed, and I give, devise
and bequeath the said net income as follows: one-eighth of said net
income to the City and County of Denver, Colorado, to maintain a
water and field lily garden in Washington Park; five eighths of said
net income to the Protestant Orphanages of Denver, Colorado, share
and share alike, and one-fourth of said net income to be paid, yearly,
to the Town of McGregor, Iowa, for park purposes.

As to this the court said, ". . . testator indicated that he
knew how to provide for an estate which should not vest immediately . . . Thus in section (b) there is a provision for deferment of vesting (type 2). Jack Liebhardt Temple had to live to
be thirty years of age before taking. Then follows a provision
for conveyance over if the conditions for the deferred vesting are
not fulfilled."
It would have been less conducive to error if the court had
said, ". . . testator indicated that he knew how to provide
for an estate which would not vest absolutely . . . Thus in section
(b) there is a provision for divestment (type 3). Jack Liebhardt
Temple had to live to be thirty years of age or had to die with issue
in order to prevent divestment. Then follows a provision for conveyance over if the conditions for the divestment are fulfilled."
It seems strange that this idea of vesting subject to divestment (type 3) as opposed to absolute vesting does not appear in
the court's reasoning. It quotes the conclusions of law of the trial
court wherein the idea is twice expressed: ".

.

. Fred . . . and

Harry . . . each took an indefeasibly vested remainder . . .;" and
"... Fred . . . and Harry . . . each took an indefeasibly vested
interest."
Furthermore, the Brief and Argument of Defendants in
Error contained this language: "We shall now demonstrate that
the language of this subparagraph (c) is the language of immediate and absolute vesting . . . ;" and ".

.

. unless the expressed

intention of the testator clearly appears in the will to the contrary, an absolute, rather than a qualified, a vested rather than a
contingent, interest or estate is created."
There is another part of the opinion from which an erroneous inference may be drawn:
Counsel argue that the interest which Harry . . . took should
be treated as a lapsed legacy . . . This argument could only be applicable in the event that Harry ['s) . . . interest . . . was a contingent,
instead of a vested remainder. It cannot apply as long as Harry
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. .. has a vested remainder, because if it is the latter it then becomes
part of his estate and is disposed of by his will. .."

This seems to be based upon the assumption that no contingent remainder can be inherited or devised. There is much
authority to the contrary. 14 Of course if the contingency is the
survival of the remainderman until some future time and he dies
too soon, the contingency can never happen, and it is for that
reason that no remainder goes to his heir or devisee.
A similar observation should be made with reference to the
apparent implication that every vested remainder goes to the
heir or devisee of the remainderman. Not so, obviously, if the
remainder were an estate for the life of the remainderman; and
for the same reason, not so if the vested remainder were divested
by the death of the remainderman under circumstances which fell
within the terms of the executory limitation, as, for example, the
death of Jack before thirty without issue.
One more point. The court says, ". . . We believe also that
the rule laid down in our statute, section 4, [article 1], chapter
40, '35 C. S. A. . . .is applicable here . . .We recently applied
that rule in Garvin v. Ruston, 121 Colo. 494, 218 P. 2d 1064."
But section 47, article 1, chapter 40, '35 C. S. A. says, "This article
shall not be so construed as to embrace last wills and testaments."
This case, Liebhardt v. Avison, involves a will. Garvin v. Ruston
involved a partnership agreement, not a will.
If anyone should read this far prior to 1953, it might be well
for him to ask some member of the Commission on Statute Revision to read the preceding paragraph.
T. G. M.
PERSONALS
Bernard E. Engler has removed his law offices from the Equitable Bldg. to the Majestic Bldg. Benjamin C. Hilliard, Jr., and
Barkley L. Clanahan will continue as partners at 242 Equitable
Bldg. under the firm name of Hilliard & Clanahan, with James J.
Delaney and Robert L. Knous as associates.
John L. Griffith, formerly Clerk of the Denver County Court,
is resuming the practice of law in partnership with Mary C. Griffith in the Midland Savings Building. Judge David Brofman appointed William B. Miller to be Clerk of the Court following Mr.
Griffith's resignation.
at the present time, with the exception of
14 SIMES, supra, § 732, note 12, "...
Maryland, it is everywhere held that remainders, whether vested or contingent . . .

descend in the same manner and to the same persons as possessory interests in land...'

§ 731, note 10, reads, "It is clear that, with the exception if possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry for condition broken, all varieties of future interests whether vested
or contingent are alienable by will in the United States."
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 164 and § 165.

June, 1951

DICTA

FEENEY V. MAHONEY: RULES ON
LAPSED LEGACIES
VICTOR B. GRANDY*

Among the many cases decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court in 1950 the case of Feeney v. Mahoney' should prove of interest to those members of the Colorado bar who come into contact
with many wills problems.
Circumstances of the case follow: Joseph P. Boyle executed
the will in question on March 23, 1943. He later became insane and
died on October 21, 1948. His sister, Bridget Feeney, a beneficiary
under the will, preceded him in death; however, her death occurred
after Boyle had become insane. Relevant provisions of the will
are as follows :2
Second: To my beloved sister, Mrs. Bridget Feeney, . . . I give
and bequeath the sum of SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS ($6,000.00)
for herself, her heirs, personal representatives and assigns forever...
Third: To my beloved brother, Mike O'Boyle. . . . I give and
bequeath the sum of FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for
himself, his heirs, personal representatives and assigns forever.
Fourth: To my beloved brother, John O'Boyle. . . . I give and
bequeath the sum of FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for
himself, his heirs, personal representatives and assigns forever.
Fifth: All the rest, remainder and residue of my property, of
every kind and character, real, personal and mixed, and wheresoever situate, I give, devise and bequeath unto . . . Mrs. Bridget
Feeney . . . Mike O'Boyle, and . . . John O'Boyle, share and share
alike and in equal portions, for themselves, their heirs, personal
representatives and assigns, forever.

The executor petitioned the county court for a construction of
the will. Judgment was given in the county court declaring that
the general legacy given to Bridget Feeney under the second provision of the will lapsed and went into the residue of the estate
upon her death prior to that of the testator. The county court further declared that Mike and John O'Boyle should each take onehalf of the residuary estate including the lapsed general legacy
and the lapsed share of the residuary estate given Bridget Feeney
under the fifth paragraph of the will.
On appeal, plaintiffs in error were John Feeney, minor son of
Bridget Feeney, and Patrick Feeney, her husband. The Supreme
Court affirmed that portion of the county court judgment holding
that the general legacy to Bridget Feeney lapsed and went intc
the residuum but reversed the part holding that the residue be
divided equally between the surviving residuary legatees. The
Supreme Court took the position the lapsed residuary legacy was
part of the testator's intestate estate to be distributed under the
statute of descent and distribution.
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
In Re Boyle's Estate, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P. 2d 357 (1950).
The court construed
the opinion in an appeal of the order and judgment of distribution based thereon and
1

reported in 1950-51 CBA Advance Sheets 277 (No. 15 for April 21, 1951).
2 From the opinion of Mr. Justice Holland.
In the second case Justice Holland
joined Justices Alter and Hilliard in dissent.
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In construing the will in question the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to discuss amendments 3 to Section 45, Chapter 176,
of 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated. 4 Section 45, the "antilapse" statute, was amended to read as follows:
Section 45. Whenever a devisee or legatee in any last will,
being a descendant of the testator, shall die before such testator,
and no provision shall be made for such contingency, the issue, if
any there be, of such devisee or legatee, shall take per stirpes the
estate devised or bequeathed, as the devisee or legatee would have
taken had he survived the testator, and if there be no such issue at
the time of the death of the testator, the estate disposed of by such
devise or legacy shall be considered, treated and deemed a part of
the residue of the estate of such testator. [Italics supplied].

The amendment substitutes the word "descendant" for the previous wording "child or grandchild." The court held that Bridget
Feeney was not "a descendant of the testator as provided for in the
statute to prevent a lapse of the legacy." By this holding the court
limits, and not without precedent, 5 the meaning of the word "descendant" as used in the statute to describe persons proceeding
from the body of the testator as opposed to a meaning descriptive
of those upon whom property has been cast by descent which can
be lineal or collateral. Because -of this construction, the "antilapse statute" still applies only where the legacy is to issue of
the testator or their lineal descendants only. An "anti-lapse"
statute similar to the one in Colorado is found in the laws of New
York.0 However, the New York statute includes the words "or to
a brother or a sister of the testator." There would have been no
problem in applying the statute to the situation in the Boyle case
had the legislature used the language added in the New York
statute.
The second section of the amendment reads:
If any devise or legacy under any will shall lapse, such devise
or legacy shall be considered, treated and be deemed a part of the
residue of the estate of the testator.

In the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court "...
the above
quoted section refers to the lapsing of legacies outside the residue,
and is not so all inclusive as to include the lapsing of a residuary
legacy under any and all circumstances." Had the legislature
intended "to include the lapsing of residuary legacies, it failed
to employ available words to effectuate that intention."' 7 The
court feels that the use of the language "any devise or legacy"
does not refer to residuary devises and legacies since it does not
specifically say anything about them in so many words. This interpretation of the word "any" in a statute runs contra to many
decisions in other courts including the United States Supreme
3

COLO. LAWS, c. 254, §§ 1, 2 (1949).
4 These sections were to affect pending as well

as future estates by provision of

Section 15, Chapter 254, '49 Session Laws.
"In re Tinker's Estate, 91 Okla. 21, 215 P. 779 (1923).
" New York Decedent

Estate Law, Section 29.

......
Colo .......
221 P. 2d 357, 362

(1950).
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Court.8 The usual definition of the word in legal terminology
gives it the full meaning of "every" or "all." However, the meaning of the word is not constant, and there is authority to the effect
that it can mean "some," "either," and many other things according to the context of the statute. 10
The law is well-settled that a legacy lapses by the death of the
legatee prior to that of the testator unless there are words of
substitution or some other provision in the will or a statute preventing such lapse.1 The main reason given for such a rule is
that a will is ambulatory and does not take effect until the death
of the testator, so the legacy never vests until the testator dies.
If the legatee dies before the testator, there is no one in whom the
legacy can vest.
Thus it appears that the decision in Feeney v. Mahoney was
in accord with the common law in so far as the lapsing of the
legacies to Bridget Feeney was concerned. The will provided that
the legacy in question in both provisions affected should go to
Bridget Feeney ". . . for herself, her heirs, personal representatives and assigns . . ." This language would indicate a gift to
Bridget Feeney alone since the words follow the usual pattern of
those used to indicate limitation rather than substitution. This
is especially true in view of the fact that nowhere in the will is a
contrary intent shown.
DISPOSITION OF LAPSED LEGACIES
The next question to be considered is the disposition to be
made of the legacies since they have lapsed. Under the prevailing
common law rule a general legacy, such as the one under clause 2
of the will which lapses because of the prior death of the legatee,
falls into the residue, if there is nothing in the will providing for
an alternative disposition of the legacy and the residuary clause
itself is not void. 1 2 The validity of the residuary clause here involved is not questioned since it follows the customary language
and is to specific persons. The main complication arises from the
fact the legatee is also a residuary legatee. There are several ways
in which the "intent of the testator" might be determined. One
rule is that the legacy will not fall into the residue when the legatee
is also a residuary legatee, but goes immediately as intestate property. Another rule is that the lapsed legacy falls into the residue
and is to be divided between the surviving residuary legatees. Still
another rule is that the legacy, having lapsed, falls into the residue,
but the share of the legacy which would have gone to the deceased
legatee goes as intestate estate. The Colorado Supreme Court is
here following the last rule, the so-called Massachusetts rule. 13
'MacMurray v. Brown, 91 U.S. 265 (1876).
'Logan v. Small, 43 Mo. 254 (1861).
10 Citizens Rwy. Co. v. Foxley, 107 Pa. St. 539 (1884).
11Gibson v. Hills, 84 Colo. 596, 272 P. 660 (1928).
12Hickey v. Costello, 80 Colo. 461, 251 P. 595 (1927). Roe v. Kavanaugh, 81 Colo.
152, 154, 254 P. 161 (1927).
13Worcester Trust Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115, 96 N.E. 132 (1911).
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The question as to the disposition of the residuary legacy is
a close one. The general rule says the gift will go as intestate
estate where one of the residuary legatees cannot take his share due
to his prior death. It is significant in this case that the gift was to
the three named legatees, "share and share alike." This shows a
desire on the part of the testator that each one of the legatees
take one-third of the residue rather than a share in the residue
as a member of a class. Following this view the Supreme Court
determined that the residuary legacy to Bridget Feeney went as
intestate estate to be distributed under the law of descent and
distribution.
14
The contrary view, followed in the courts of only two states,
holds that to allow the gift to go as intestate estate is contrary to
the policy of effectuating the intent of the testator. This view furthers itself in the logic that a reduction in the number of legatees
does not effect the force of the grounds upon which a lapsed legacy
falls into the residuum, and if the rule is applicable to one, it should
be applicable to both general and residuary legacies.
AUTHORITY CONTRA TESTATOR'S INTENT?

It is clear that the decision in Feeney v. Mahoney follows the
great weight of authority. The decision is in accord with a New
York case 15 decided in the same month. The New York court
held a lapsed residuary legacy would not further lapse into the
residuum but went on to say that "the rule is not one of strongly
prevailing type and yields readily to any fairly tenable indication
that a testamentary intent may be derived and established from
some intimation of a secondary or standby residuary provision."' 16
In the Colorado case there seems to be no secondary provision as
evidenced by the will. Therefore the cases are in apposition.
In rendering the decision in Feeney v. Mahoney the Supreme
Court ruled the amendments to the statute did not affect the case.
The court went on to declare that the prevailing common law
rules governed the disposition of the legacies. The effect was to
prevent the heirs of Bridget Feeney from gaining any benefit
which might have accrued to them by the will. The other legatees
received a larger sum than that intended by the testator. Still
another result was to take from the testator the right to designate
the disposition of that part of the estate declared intestate. However, since there was no alternative put forth by the will, that part
of the estate had to go without the will. It is plain that the intent
of the testator as expressed by the will could not be followed
since the circumstances under which the will was written had
changed.
'- Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kan. 380, 207 P. 819 (1922) ; West v. West, 89 Ind. 529
(1883).
,sIn Re Bowman's Will, 97 N.Y.S. 478 (May, 1950).
IS Ibid, p. 481.
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THE 1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE
RELINQUISHMENT AND ADOPTION LAWS
PHILIP B. GILLIAM
Judge of the Denver Juvenile and Family Court

Changes in the relinquishment and adoption laws of Colorado were enacted by the 1951 General Assembly in response to
widespread demands by the public and child welfare organizations. Illegal relinquishments and a rising black market traffic in
babies throughout the country is cause for close scrutiny of the
safeguards provided in our laws against such abuses.
Colorado is one of the first states to put through curative
amendments, and our success was due in large part to broad nonpartisan support, and the recommendations received by the Juvenile Court from the State Home for Dependent Children, Catholic Charities, Children's Aid Society, Child Welfare Division of
the Bureau of Public Welfare, the Jewish Child and Family Welfare Service, and from various members of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
B. 219
House Bill No. 219, designed to put an end to the illegal
traffic of selling babies, or making changes in their custody outside of official channels, black market babies, was sponsored by
Representatives Wade and Carter, and Senators Gambill, Henry,
Cheever, Bennett and Davis.
Section 1 of H. B. 219 amends Section 3, Chapter 129, Session Laws of 1949, the Jurisdictionand Venue section, by adding
a penalty for violation, making it a misdemeanor punishable by
fine or imprisonment, or both, for any relinquishment not in accordance with statutory provisions. Parents relinquishing a child
and persons receiving a child for adoption are covered by the
added language. Excluded from the new penalty provision are
those cases where the relinquishment is to "step-parents, grandparent or grandparents, uncle or aunt of said child." Any juvenile
or county court, other than a county court in a county wherein
a juvenile court is functioning, shall have jurisdiction of all relinquishment petitions.
The penalty clause reads:
RELINQUISHMENTS-H.

Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined a sum of money not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00),
or imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, or both such
fine and imprisonment.

ADOPTIONS-H. B. 220
House Bill No. 220, sponsored by Representatives Wade and
Pellett and Senators Bennett, Cheever and Davis, contains amend-
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ments to seven sections of Chapter 106, Session Laws of 1949.
Section 1, amending subsections (2) (b) and (2) (g) of
Section 6, Consent to Adoption, provides for an exception to the
necessity for obtaining consent to proposed adoption from both
natural parents in the case of a child born out of wedlock. An
additional exception to the necessity for obtaining consent of both
natural parents to proposed adoption is made in those cases,
where without cause, there has been failure to provide reasonable
support for a child for one year or more. It is now provided that
consent of the Superintendent of the State Home for Dependent
and Neglected Children will be proper consent for the adoption
of any child in the care, custody and control of the State Home
for Dependent and Neglected Children. This is an alternative
provision to consent by the Board of Control of such institution.
Section 2, amending subsection (1) of Section 7 of the 1949
law on Hearing and Examination, provides that where the child
has been in an adoption home under supervision of a duly licensed child placement agency, the State Home for Dependent and
Neglected Children, or any public welfare department, the court
may hear the petition for adoption forthwith and grant the adoption decree (as formerly, this also pertains to a child who is a
grandchild or stepchild of one of the petitioners). Otherwise, a
30 day waiting period is required between filing of petition and
hearing of the adoption petition and examining of interested
parties.
Section 3, amending Section 8, Notice of Hearing, requires
notice of pending proceedings on adoption, in case of a child
not a grandchild or stepchild of petitioner or petitioners, to any
interested person or agency, unless such person or agency has
already consented, and adds the requirement of notice to the
adoptive child if over twelve years of age.
Subsections (1) (d) and (2) of Section 9, Hearing on the
Petition, are amended by Section 4. If, in the discretion of the
court, it will serve the best interests of the child, a forthwith
decree on the findings may be entered and a final decree of adoption be granted. The former provision for an interlocutory decree to become final at the end of one year is maintained in the
amended bill.
The wording under subsection (2) is changed to any waiting period in place of the former such, to encompass the court's
discretionary powers regarding the forthwith or interlocutory
decrees. This change is also made under Section 5, amending Section 10, Final Decree of Adoption.
A clause is added by Section 6, amending subsection (2) of
Section 11, Legal Effects of Final Decree of Adoption, protecting the legal rights or obligations of the natural parent from being divested in those adoptions where the adopting parent is a
step-parent married to a natural parent.
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Under Section 7, amending Section 15, Records, adoption records and papers will be considered confidential records of the court,
striking the former provision for sealing, and such records shall
not be open to public inspection unless by order of court. A provision also is added by this section that only one docket fee will
be assessed in cases involving more than one child.

THE RETAIL MOTOR VEHICLE INSTALLMENT
SALES ACT
LOUIS A. HELLERSTEIN
of the Denver Bar

By the enactment of the "Retail Motor Vehicle Installment
Sales Act" 1 Colorado became the eleventh state to enact specific
legislation covering the installment sale of motor vehicles. The
act, which becomes effective on July 1, 1951, is restricted to installment sales of such type of personal property. It does not affect nor
legislate upon cash sales nor does it affect installment retail sales
of any articles of personal property except motor vehicles as defined in the act. Transactions other than retail sales are not affected by the act.
The act covers those engaged in the sale of motor vehicles
upon the installment plan and financing institutions who purchase
or lend upon contracts resulting from such sales and make collection thereon such as banks, finance and loan companies. An individual selling his car is not affected by the act nor are those
banks or finance and loan companies who make loans upon the
collateral of such contracts or purchase such contracts, but who
do not (prior to default of the seller or borrower) collect the payments upon such contracts.
Motor vehicles generally as covered by the act are passenger
cars, trucks, station wagons and motorcycles. Road machinery,
tractors and agricultural machinery of a similar nature are excepted from the provisions of the act.
If a sale of a motor vehicle upon an installment basis is involved the act applies even though the form of contract purports
to be a leasing or bailment when the bailee or lessee contracts to
pay as compensation for its use a sum substantially equivalent to
the value of the property and bailee or lessee is bound or has the
option of becoming the owner thereof.
A finance company or a bank which makes a direct loan to a
purchaser to finance the purchase of a motor vehicle is not subject
1 H.B. 332, approved April 12, 1951, Holland's Legislative Service, p. 448.
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to the act. In such a case neither is the installment sales contract
subject to the act.
The act purports to accomplish the following four principal
objectives:
1. Full disclosure of terms of sale and costs.
2. Mandatory provisions for rebate of part of the "time price
differential" upon prepayment.
3. The limiting of delinquency and collection charges.
4. General provisions safeguarding the rights of installment
purchasers of motor vehicles.
Rates, discounts, charges or reserves are not regulated.
LICENSING PROVISIONS
Individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations or
other operating organizations, exclusive of banks, trust companies
and industrial banks, who (1) act as principal or broker in the
acquiring of retail installment paper from the seller or lend thereon and make the collections upon such contracts from purchasers,
and (2) those motor vehicle dealers who retain their own contracts
of sale are designated as a "Sales Finance Company" and are required to be licensed under the act. A sales finance company, which
makes loans upon such installment contracts or buys such contracts
in bulk and does not, in the absence of default by the seller or
pledgor, collect the payments, is exempt from being licensed. As
stated, banks, trust companies and industrial banks even though
they act as sales finance companies and buy contracts or lend upon
contracts and make collections thereon are not required to be
licensed.
Companies making direct loans to finance the purchase of
motor vehicles are not required to be licensed.
Motor vehicle dealers who sell their contracts are subject to
the terms of the act but are not required to be licensed. Motor
Vehicle dealers who retain their contracts are required to be
licensed as a "Sales Finance Company".
Applications for licenses are filed with the State Bank Commissioner. No convenience or advantage clause is contained in
the act and licenses are automatically issued upon payment of the
fee required and the filing of the application. The license for the
calendar year or any part thereof is $100 for the principal office
in the state and $25 for each branch office. All licenses expire
December 31st of each year. Changes of locations are endorsed
without charge.
The Bank Commissioner is given power to suspend or revoke
licenses for various causes after due notice and a hearing. The
principal grounds for revocation or suspension are (1) failure to
comply with the act; (2) defrauding a buyer; (3) failure to
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comply with a written agreement with the buyer; or (4) fraudulent misrepresentation, circumvention or concealment by any subterfuge or device of material matters required to be stated in a
sales contract.
It is made a misdemeanor to operate as a "Sales Finance Company" without procuring a license as required by the act.
THE SALES CONTRACT

The act requires the seller and purchaser to enter into a written contract for the retail sale and purchase of a motor vehicle
upon an installment plan basis. Such contract must contain all the
agreements of the parties, must be signed by the buyer and a copy
furnished the buyer at the time of the execution of the contract.
The execution of a sales contract in blank is prohibited except that
serial numbers or other identifying marks which are not available
at the time of its execution may be inserted later.
Each such installment sales contract is required to contain the
following numbered items and in the following order:
1. The price of the motor vehicle which is the subject matter
of the retail installment contract if the sale were made for cash;
2. The amount of the retail buyer's down payment, stated
separately;
(a) The amount of any cash payment; and
(b) The amount of goods given in payment, if any;
3. The unpaid balance of the cash price, which is the difference between items (1) and (2) ;
4. The cost to the retail buyer of any insurance and any
option of benefits included in the transaction, specifying the types
of coverage and benefits;
5. The amount of the time price differential;
6. The time balance owed by the retail buyer to the retail
seller and the number of installment payments required and the
amount and date of each payment necessary finally to pay the time
balance, which is the sum of items (3), (4), and (5). The amount
of items (4) and (5) may be added together and stated as one
sum in the contract, and if so stated, the retail seller or his assignee
shall, within thirty (30) days after the making of the retail installment contract, mail or cause to be mailed to the retail buyer
at his address as shown on such contract, a statement reciting
separately the amount of item (4) and the amount of item (5).
7. The time selling price of the motor vehicle, which is the
sum of items (2) and (6).
The above numbered items may be set out in the sales contract or in the mortgage, if desired, or, the contract may be recited
in the purchase order while the conditions as to the retention of
the lien or mortgage may be set out in a note and chattel mortgage
as separate instruments. Many sellers prefer to use a chattel mortgage when making an installment sale which recites the full terms
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of the sale as well as the mortgaging or retaining of a lien to secure
the balance of the purchase price.
The duty of entering into the required written sales contract
and compliance with the provisions of the act relative thereto
devolves upon the vendor of the motor vehicle. It is not an obligation of the purchaser or pledgee of such contracts to ascertain that
a proper contract is entered into by the seller and buyer; nor is
the validity of a note and mortgage affected by failure of the seller
to enter into the type of sales contract provided by the act.
If chattel mortgage instruments or other lien instruments are
used, full compliance with the chattel mortgage is still necessary.
The installment Sales Act does not vary or change the Colorado
Chattel Mortgage Act.
COLLECTION AND DELINQUENCY CHARGES

Within the limitations set out in the act, collection charges or
delinquent charges are permitted. To be collectible appropriate
provisions covering the right to collect delinquent charges or collection expense or attorneys' fees should be contained in the note
and mortgage or contract.
The following delinquency charges or collection expenses are
prinitted by the act:
(a) 5% of the installments in default or $5.00 whichever is a
lesser amount when such default has continued for a period of at least ten days.
(b) An attorney fee not exceeding 15% of the amount due
when the collection is handled by an attorney who is not
a salaried employee of the holder of the contract, note or
mortgage.
Unless delinquency has continued for at least a ten day period,
collection charges are not permitted. Also, interest upon delinquent installments is not permitted in view of the delinquency
charges provided for by the act.
The attorneys' fees permitted are in addition to the delinquency and collection charges permitted.
REFUND UPON PREPAYMENT

Since most installment sales contracts contain a finance charge
or a "time sale differential" (added to the cash sales price) based
upon the period of payment, the act provides for a refund for prepayment. The refund formula set out in the act is what has commonly become known as the "Rule of 78ths". Prior to making such
computation of a refund, the holder of the contract is permitted to
deduct and retain $15 as the acquisition cost of the contract.
A buyer has the privilege of prepayment at any time. Regardless of the terms of the written instruments, as a matter of law,
prepayment in full by the buyer may be made at any time. If the
refund is less than $1.00 none need be made.
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The buyer may also elect to cancel the insurance written in
connection with the loan and receive cancellation of the unearned
premium upon a short rate basis.
PROVISIONS FOR BUYER'S PROTECTION

Insurance-If insurance is included in the retail sales installment contract, within 30 days after the date of execution of such
contract, the seller or holder of the contract or mortgage is required to send or cause to be sent to the buyer a policy or policies
of insurance or certificate of insurance showing the amount of the
premium, the kind of insurance, scope of coverage and the terms,
conditions, exemptions and limitations of the contract of insurance.
Insurance can only be written by insurance companies authorized to do business in Colorado.
Statement of Time Price Differential and Insurance-In the
event the original sales contract contains a combined figure showing the amount of the time price differential and insurance as one
item, then within 30 days from the date of the contract, a statement showing separately the cost of the insurance and the time
price differential is to be furnished the buyer.
Confession Judgments-In connection with retail installment
sales of motor vehicles no provision for confession of judgment
is valid or enforceable.
Complaints-A buyer, having a complaint with reference to
his retail installment contract may file the same in writing with
the Bank Commissioner. When the Commissioner receives such
written complaint, he is authorized to inspect the instruments relating to the transaction complained of.
The act gives the Commissioner the right to issue subpoenas,
compel the attendance of witnesses, administer oaths and generally
supervise operations under the act. It is presumed that a complaint found to be justified could result in the Commissioner exercising his right to suspend or revoke a license.
The act also provides for the enforcement of subpoenas
through Court action if a witness refuses to appear and testify.
Payment of Contract-If a contract of sale or mortgage and
note is assigned and no notice is given to obligor thereof, a buyer
making payment to the seller or payee named therein, is protected. To protect himself, an assignee should give notice of the
assignment to the buyer of actual or intended assignment. The
act, however, does not require mandatory notice of assignment of
such contracts or notes and mortgages evidencing the balance of
such purchase price of the motor vehicle.
Rate Charts-Every Sales Finance Company is required to
keep on file with the Commissioner the maximum rate chart or
charts in use and numbered for identification.
The "Retail Motor Vehicle Installment Act" is a new experiment in the field of installment sales which has had such a tre-
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mendous growth in our country; it fills a need in our state to
safeguard the interest of buyers of motor vehicles. It may be
necessary in the future to pass legislation covering other fields of
installment sales.
The act is a forward step in the interests of the public,
founded upon a need that has developed toward legislation of this
character. It will be of interest to watch the developments that
occur and thereafter determine the need, if any, of any such
amendments to make the act and its purposes adequate and effective.

YOUR SPECIAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AND
MILITARY SERVICE
In view of the still-pending threat of military service for
many members of the association, those who carry the Special
Disability Insurance of the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company via the Udry Agency, Denver, will be interested in the following statement of policy from the company:
"The primary purpose of our Special Disability Insurance
Plan is to furnish income protection during the period that you
are physically unable to perform your usual civilian, professional
duties.
It is our understanding that if you enter military or naval
service the Government will see that in the event of a disability1. Your income will continue.
2. You will be provided with hospitalization and medical care.
3. That National Service Insurance is available to you at exceptionally low rates.
Therefore, should you enter Military or Naval Service, we
will arrange to place the coverage provided under this plan in
suspense on the following basis:
A. By returning the unearned premium on a pro-rata basis,
and
B. Granting you the privilege of applying for automatic reinstatement when you are discharged from military or naval service, provided written application for reinstatement is made within
forty days after you have resumed the regular duties of your
profession.
C. When your Special Disability Policy is reinstated, there
will be no back premiums or arrears to pay. Your reinstatement
premium will be pro-rated to the next renewal date of the other
members of your Society."
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

EXCESS PROFIT TAX DISTRIBUTIONS

No distribution of capital nor of earnings by a corporation
subject to excess profit taxes should be made within the first sixty
days of the taxable year because such distribution may affect the
computation of the increase or decrease in equity capital.
DEPRECIATION-WHEN DEDUCTIBLE

Section 23 (1) was amended by the 1942 Act to allow a deduction for depreciation of property held by the taxpayer for the
production of income, regardless of whether the property is actually used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.
Although the former law, restricting the deduction to "property used in the trade or business" has always been interpreted
by the Bureau to allow depreciation on any building from which
the taxpayer-owner received rent, the amended law makes it clear
that all property "held for the production of income" is depreciable, even before actual use and the deduction is not conditional
upon receipt or accrual of income from the property in the taxable year.
The above provision is important as to investment property.
The capital gain period of six months clearly starts to run from
the time the property becomes subject to depreciation. See Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F. (2d) 269, 35 A.F.T.R. 669, and
cases cited therein.
STOCKHOLDERS' ADDITIONAL

CORPORATE TAX

If a corporation has been liquidated in full, all assets have
been distributed, and stockholders, as transferees, are required
to pay corporation tax deficiencies, the payment by each stockholder is deductible in full. Switlik, 13 T.C. 121, affirmed. The
foregoing applies only if the corporate tax liability was unknown
at liquidation. In liquidating a corporation therefore, it can be
desirable to distribute all assets rather than to withhold some
assets for the purpose of paying taxes until the statute of limitaions has run. The determination of this question will depend upon
the responsibility of all stockholders.
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REAL PROPERTY CAPITAL GAIN
Because there seems to be confusion as to when the sale of
real property is a capital gain, we restate a few rules:
1. Property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business is an ordinary asset and the gain is taxable in full.
The danger in this rule lies in the fact that one not primarily in
the business of buying and selling real estate can find himself in
the position of holding property primarily for sale to customers
within the above rule, if he buys and sells several parcels within
a short period of time, or if he buys unimproved property merely
for the purpose of resale at a profit, or if he subdivides unimproved property and sells the same in lots from time to time, or
if he buys and sells apartment houses or any other definite class
of real property as a side line but more or less frequently over a
period of years.
The determination of the above controversial proposition approaches a twilight zone and lawyers should be careful to caution
clients regarding the foregoing, particularly those who are purchasing tracts of land for resale at a profit in the current real
estate boom.
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